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ABSTRACT 
A growing interest in affect holds much promise for anthropology by providing a new frame to 
examine and articulate subjective and intersubjective states, which are key parts of human 
consciousness and behavior.  Affect has its roots in the social, an observation that did not go 
unnoticed by Durkheim and since then kept in view by those social scientists interested in the 
emotions, feelings, and subjectivity. However, the challenge for ethnographers has always been 
to articulate in words and conceptualize theoretically what is only felt and sensed. What we are 
calling "evocative ethnography" is an ethnography that meets this challenge to make room for, 
and hold onto, feelings and affect in its description and explanation. The papers in this special 
issue accomplish that, as well as, provide some anthropological insights into affect theory.       
KEYWORDS: affect, affect theory, anthropology of emotions, subjectivity 
  
The very act of congregating is a powerful stimulant. Once the individuals are gathered 
together, a sort of electricity is generated from their closeness and quickly launches them 
to an extraordinary height of exaltation. Every emotion expressed resonates without 
interference in consciousness that are wide open to external impressions, each one 
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echoing the others. The initial impulse is thereby amplified each time it is echoed, like an 
avalanche that grows as it goes along. And since passions so heated and so free from all 
control cannot help but spill over, from every side there are nothing but wild movements, 
shouts, downright howls, and deafening noises of all kinds that further intensify the state 
they are expressing.  - Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1976 
[1915]: 217-218) 
The “we” incites participation and takes on a life of its own, even reflecting its own 
presence. It’s a thing that happens when e-mails with joking commentary show up in your 
in-box and you pass them on for some reason. Or when intimate public slogans float into 
a collective mode of address: “Know what I’m sayin’?” “That’s just wrong,” “I don’t 
THINK so,” That’s what I am talkin’ about,” “I hear you,” “It’s all good.” Or when 
bumper stickers talk back to each other as if they can’t help it: “Shit happens,” “Magic 
happens,” “My child is an honor student,” “My child beat up your honor student,” “Just 
say no,” “Just do it,” “Vote Bush,” “I voted for Bush and got Dick,” “Bush is a punk 
ass chump,” “Bush bin Lyin’.” - Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects (2007:28) 
 
These two descriptions of aspects of “the social” are written nearly one hundred years 
apart (Brown 2014). Emile Durkheim’s quote is his famous description of the corroboree ritual 
of the Warramunga, which was the inspiration for his approach to the sociology of religion. It is 
an enthusiastic testament to the subjective power of the collective moment, which further 
confirmed the concept of the social as a unique realm of study separate from the political and 
economic. Kathleen Stewart’s quote is of another sociality, one more tame and domesticated, but 
nevertheless a testimony to the subjective “we-ness” that lies at the heart of the social.  Both 
authors acknowledge the existence and uniqueness of an inter-subjective realm of the social, yet 
they react to it differently. For the sake of science, Durkheim distanced himself from the 
“powerful stimulant”, “electricity”, and “extraordinary height of exaltation” of the congregating 
throng, dismissing it as “primitive” and “not fully subordinate to reason and will.”  In place of 
the word “primitive”, Durkheim might very well have invoked the terms “feminine”, 
“primordial”, “tribal”, “childish”, or “ephemeral”, reflecting the intellectual bias of his time that 
eschewed anything associated with the emotional. This dismissal of feelings associated with 
human sociality would un-anchor the new science of sociology from the sensory of the inter-
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subjective realm, making it susceptible to abstraction, reification, and fetishization, and opening 
it up to reductive explanations of the social (Csordas 1990: 33).  
Stewart takes a different position. She accepts the “we-ness” as is and does not turn her 
back on it, keeping it present. Her position represents the so-called "affective turn" in the social 
sciences and rise of a new theoretical frame that acknowledges and analytically tries to 
accommodate the power of feelings, sentimentality, intimacies, and emotion in the public realm. 
Affect theory has the promise to bridge the conceptual dualisms that have plagued the social 
sciences, such as those between mind and body, self and other, private and public, personal and 
political, and agency and structure (Lutz and White 1986: 406-409). However, the danger in 
trying to grasp intellectually what is fundamentally felt and sensed might reduce affect to an 
empty shell of a concept following the same fate as the “social”, a limited concept that remains 
vague (Brown 2014: 23). To avoid that fate, affect theory must come to life by means of an 
integration of abstraction and illustration. The challenge is to write evocatively about culture in a 
way that emotions and feelings of living, socially situated subjects are conveyed to the reader, 
what might be called "evocative ethnography" (Stoller 2005; 2007).  
Feelings matter. They are an integral part of human consciousness and behavior. Human 
beings are as much feeling creatures as they are thinking ones. Hunches and intuition play a 
major role in reasoning and passion provides impetus for action. The neuroscientist 
Antonio Damasio (1994) argues that the capacity to feel is a necessary component of rational 
decision-making. Early on, the social psychologist Robert Zajonc (1980) postulated that feelings 
emerge prior to and independently of cognition (see also Massumi 1995). Affective neuroscience 
attempts to identify different parts of the brain that are associated with emotions and cognition 
(Dalgleish 2004), and neuro-biology seeks to understand “affective systems” that influence 
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behavior (Charland 2001, 151). Anthropologist Walter Goldschmidt (2006) sees affect as a 
missing piece in understanding human behavior and evolution. He regards ritual as a "language 
of sentiment" that extends maternal and sexual feelings outward to form wider social attachments, 
a position long recognized by anthropologists examining the affective or “felt” component of 
rituals, albeit through a structural functionalist lens (Leavitt 1996: 526). Gender and Queer 
Studies scholar Sara Ahmed (2004) understands feelings as a pre-linguistic, precognitive, and 
inter-subjective medium, which circulates through the social body, mediating between the 
psychic and social, and the collective and individual, working to bind and separate 
subjects. Lauren Berlant (2008) calls for a popular feminism based on a collective affect that 
does not shun sentimentality and is separate from but ultimately inspires an emancipatory 
politics.  In general, anthropologists have recognized the importance of emotions in culture (Lutz 
and White 1986; Leavitt 1996; Luhrmann 2006) and have incorporated the subjective dimension 
in their theories. Examples abound, including  Gregory Bateson’s (1958) ethos, Victor Turner’s 
(1967) recognition of the orectic function of symbols and his notions of communitas and 
liminality, Meyer Fortes (1969) axiom of amity, Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) habitus, Sherry 
Ortner's (1984) practice theory, James Fernandez’s (1986) play of tropes, Paul Stoller's (1989) 
sensual ethnography, Thomas Csordas's (1990) ethnographic praxis, and Michael Herzfeld’s 
(2005) social poetics and cultural intimacies. 
We are both pleased and worried about the “turn” in anthropology and related fields to a 
relatively new focus on “affect”, a term itself has multiple meanings and is difficult to define, 
identify and pinpoint (Massumi 1995: 88; Thrift 2004: 59; McElhinny 2010: 310; Seigworth and 
Gray 2010; Berlant and Greenwald 2012).  “Affect” is both a noun and a transitive verb. As a 
transitive verb, “affect” entails a subject and an object or set of objects. As such it involves an 
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interrelationship, one who affects and one who is affected. As a noun, “affect” has to do with 
senses and sensibilities and their relationship to the mind and to the body, aspects that are 
inseparable even as there is attempt to tease out the elements, to dissect feelings, desires, 
inclinations, intentions, and their effects on the level of the individual and on the level of the 
collective. Affect is something deeply interior but that also has outward manifestations. An 
individual with no facial expression, who does not gesture, whose tone of voice is monotone—
seems dead—we might say that person “has no affect.” Conversely, an individual who takes on 
exaggerated expression, gesture, tone of voice—seems overly vivid. We might say that person is 
“affected”. The principles of collective affect may not be equivalent to those applied to 
individuals. Yet collectivities can and do have affect. The feelings that swell, the passion of the 
group, the vibrant intensity of the collective can be found in a political rally, religious gatherings, 
a music concert, a family get-together, sports events, and in mass celebrations. The organizing 
principle of mass celebrations can be any number of constructed identities—national, religious, 
gender, ethnic or racial, sexual orientation—or might be based on a common experience of 
oppression, violence, or struggle, of joy or of memory of actual or imagined events. Thus, affect 
as noun and verb has as much to do with senses and sensibilities of the collective unconscious 
and conscious and the body writ large—the body politic, the social and the cultural as it does 
with an individual’s mind, body and emotion. 
We are pleased by the focus on affect because it provides a space for highlighting, 
examining and privileging feelings, not just thought or the rational mind, and it emphasizes the 
part played by “structures of feeling” in social activity and interaction. Thus, the study of affect 
as both noun and verb suggests multiple dialectics: the individual and the collective, habitus and 
identity, emotion and relationship, consciousness and action.  
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Yet, we are worried about this new turn for a number of reasons. First, we wonder if 
positioning “affect” as a new field of study requiring new theory, a new orientation, a new 
language, and new ethnographic ground will serve to erase what anthropology and other social 
sciences have long had to say about the dialectics of social life, its processes, dynamics, 
relationships, and formations on a field of action. Contemporary theoretical debates parsing 
differences between the anthropology of affect and of emotion seem to disregard that 
anthropologists have long been concerned with these issues, though not necessarily invoking the 
word used today.  
For example, Richard and Rudnyckyj argue that the study of “affect” diverges from 
anthropological work on emotion (2009: 61). For them “affect suggests relations practised 
between individuals rather than experiences borne by sole individuals (ibid.),” purportedly the 
purview of “emotion”, a distinction we are not convinced is significant. Put another way, Bonnie 
McElhinny in her 2010 Annual Review article, “The Audacity of Affect,” writes  “Richard and 
Rudnyckyj note that current work on the ‘economy of affect’ differs from earlier feminist studies 
of ‘emotion work’ by focusing on ‘the way in which subjects circulate within and are formed 
through affect, rather than the circulation of emotions between subjects’ (McElhinny 2010: 311-
312),” a distinction we find a bit artificial and too dismissive of the scholarly work that has come 
before. “The anthropology of emotions” is multidimensional, and as Lutz and White noted nearly 
30 years ago, includes: “… being ‘about’ social relations; emotional meaning systems will reflect 
those relations and will, through emotion's constitution of social behavior, structure them” (Lutz 
and White 1986: 420).  
Likewise, we worry that the positioning of “affect” studies as new will serve to erase the 
contributions of feminist scholars who have long understood the significance of “affect”—again, 
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even if they didn’t necessarily use that term—to signal that which must be examined, understood 
and altered, including the formation, circulation and reproduction of gendered subjectivities, 
sentiments, roles and duties, and the power dynamics at the center of social relations. Feminist 
activists and scholars have also long understood that the personal is the political and vice-versa, 
an understanding that refuses to relegate the private self in relation to others, or the affective or 
the experiential to a secondary role but sees these as central features and products of larger social, 
cultural, political and economic dynamics and conditions. 
Related to these concerns is our worry that as scholars seek to construct, define and 
theorize a new field, they will lose themselves and the rest of us in impossible, arcane language, 
obscuring more than they illuminate. In The Affect Theory Reader, for example, a 2010 volume 
described on the back jacket as a “field-defining collection,” the editors introduce the subject 
matter in an introduction titled “An Inventory of Shimmers,” and explain “there is no single, 
generalizable theory of affect; not yet, and (thankfully) there never will be” (emphasis added). 
They also write, “If the individual essays of this volume are momentarily united, it is in their 
collectively singular attempts to address what transpires in the affective bloom-space of an ever-
processual materiality (Seigworth and Gregg 2010: 9),” a terribly opaque sentence. In “Writing 
Shame,” a lovely essay in the same volume, gender scholar Elspeth Probyn (2010) quotes Eve 
Sedgwick and Adam Frank to say, “…current treatises on affect tend to lack feeling…” and 
furthermore:  
Affect is treated as a unitary category, with a unitary history and unitary politics. There is 
no theoretical room for any difference between, say, being amused, being disgusted, 
being ashamed, and being enraged. Genres are differentiated not in relation to the kind of 
affect they may evoke or generate but far more simply, by the presence or absence of 
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some rarified substance called Affect. An abstract way of approaching affect and emotion 
places the writing itself in an uninterested relation to affect. This is a contradiction in 
terms—affects are inherently interested…How can you represent a sense of emotional 
and affective intensity if the feeling in question is generalized in the amorphous category 
of Affect? [Probyn 2010: 74]  
Finally, we worry that the emphasis on “affect” will become an end in itself, moving us 
away from identifying and examining those powerful forces that set the conditions for making 
some forms of affect possible and others less likely or impossible. We believe this is what 
McElhinny means by the “intertwined and continuing gaps in the literature…noted early on by 
Lutz and White (1986), Abu Lughod and Lutz (1990), and Besnier (1990) in calling for more 
historical approaches…and further studies on hegemony, emotion, and social structure” 
(McElhinny 2010:312). Recent studies that situate affect historically, politically and 
economically include Masco’s (2008) look at the fear of nuclear annihilation induced in Cold 
War America, Muehlebach’s (2011) study of the manipulation of compassion in Italy’s post-
Fordist volunteer service sector, and Mazzarella’s (2010) exploration of Gandhi’s legacy, 
embodied in images of his ascetic body. 
To the extent that the new focus and theoretical formulations advance understanding 
about social, cultural, psychological and political phenomena that have not before been examined 
and about which we have inadequate knowledge, it can be useful. To the extent that new theory 
offers a substantive, “real” distinction between “it” and related phenomena, it can have value. To 
the extent that putting affect “front stage in cultural descriptions and theory” enhances our 
understanding of its relationship to other aspects of social life and large-scale social forces that 
shape the social field of action, it offers great promise (Wolf 1990: 587). To the extent that its 
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proponents can write about it in clear, comprehensible terms, we can evaluate whether or not we 
indeed need a new idiom—some might call it jargon—to talk about the empathy, sentiment, 
feelings, and emotions that have been found in the ethnographic literature from early on.  Of 
course, there is always room for improvement as Andrew Beatty reminds readers in an essay on 
emotion, narrative, and the limits of ethnography: “ethnographic writing, by design, gets emotion 
wrong” (2010: 439). To the extent that the new “turn” can help us “get affect right,” it might 
bring us closer to what many consider as anthropology’s purpose: to recognize our own 
humanity and that of others. 
The articles in this special issue on affect and evocative ethnography discuss emotions, 
feelings, and sentiments in a variety of cultural contexts and encounters. The authors center 
emotion in their description and analysis of cultural behavior and are not afraid to privilege the 
role of feelings as central to understanding cultural meanings. Thus, in these articles "complex 
subjectivities" (Ortner 2005) are enlivened, and we see the ways in which they span the personal, 
interpersonal and transpersonal (Jackson 2012).   
Edith Turner's opening article, "The Spirituality of Africa: The First Encounter," is a 
beautifully written evocation of her odyssey-like journey into anthropology. We travel with 
Turner as she leaves behind a class-ridden and exhausted post World War II England to join her 
loving husband in the field among the Ndembu in 1950s Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). The 
excitement of the journey becomes a cathartic purging of past intellectual and emotional 
attachments, while opening up new theoretical insights and understandings. The physical and 
emotional journey becomes a metaphor for a parallel intellectual journey from positive 
empiricism of British structural functionalism to a spiritualized African sensibility in which 
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feelings are front and center, influencing both her and her husband's intellectual and theoretical 
development, his work on symbolism and ritual process (Turner, V. 1967; 1974) and her work on 
communitas (Turner, E. 2012). Her description of Victor's tromping off one morning to the field, 
side-by-side with his informant, chortling, is a singular impression of love. Turner vividly 
describes the laying on of hands, and the transition of a girl to her future as a sexually mature 
woman during an initiation rite. The Grandfather spirit and emotions invoked in the Chihamba 
ritual become real to the participants, including the author, providing a necessary release for a 
community ravaged by disease and communal discord. For Turner, the inter-subjective feeling of 
joy rising from the experience, what Durkheim originally described and then discounted, is 
essential even as the full scope of sensations and their meanings are difficult to capture in words.  
Considering the spiritual world as an affective realm is also the subject of Julia 
Cassaniti's article on Thai ghosts, "Intersubjective Affect and Embodied Emotion: Feeling the 
Thai Supernatural." As with the Ndembu, the spirits here are real with real effects. Cassaniti 
describes the intimate relationships and encounters her informants have with ghosts, and the 
emotions those spirits evoke in them, prompting specific human responses and actions. The Thai 
spirit world constitutes an affective cosmological space similar to that describe by Michael 
Jackson (2012) from his research in Sierra Leone, where the unconscious is construed as 
constituting a space out there in the world, exterior to the mind and body. Cassaniti points out 
that Thai religious practice is not all about feelings and ghostly encounters and sensations, but 
also about how individuals manage these feelings and discipline themselves to maintain a level 
of calm and composure. Cassaniti explores affect theory in order to reveal a similarity in the 
ways her Thai informants describe the supernatural world and Western scholars talk about affect. 
Her article suggests distinct ways that affect might be conceived, constructed and articulated in 
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other cultures; in the Thai case, as supernatural or ghostly energies. Through the lens of the Thai 
supernatural she tries to parse emotion and affect and their relationship, shedding some light on 
affect theory.   
Lucinda Carspecken's "The Unbounded Self: Peak Experiences and Border Crossings in 
Southern Indiana" describes four extreme cases of subjective, ecstatic experiences among neo-
Paganists in the United States. Her informants’ vivid experiences challenge conventional 
understandings of the self. They are cases of heightened sensory awareness, self-affirming 
euphoria, and disembodied mania. Here we reach, if not exceed the transpersonal end of the 
subjective arc with the blurring of the within and without, but with some sense of self-
consciousness maintained. For one informant, it was the exhilaration she experienced after 
having faced up to an abusive boyfriend and driving away from the small, hometown life she had 
been living. The experience affirmed for her the courageous choices she had made, enabling a 
new life. Here affect can be understood as a prompt to action, an example of Ortner's "subjective 
countercurrent" that provides space and agency for subalterns within a dominant discourse 
(Ortner 2005, 5; see also Herzfeld 2005). Another informant describes how ecstatic drumming 
and dancing helped peel away layers of the self and realize a deeper connection and 
identification with others and the world.  The disembodied sensory experience of a third 
informant is described in mystical terms; he senses he is part of a big ball of light, feeling no pain, 
sorrow or suffering. The fourth informant experiences an acute sensory state of the world around 
him in which natural objects display auras. Such vision has a benign effect on his temperament 
that in turn has a similar contagious effect on those around him. In all, these are perceived by 
informants as life affirming experiences which ultimately bolster the subject's sense of self 
amidst often difficult, potentially life-draining circumstances.     
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Nehemia Stern in his article, “’I Desire Sanctity’: Sanctity and Separateness among 
Jewish Religious Zionists in Israel/Palestine," discusses the theological construction of a 
religious affect and subjectivity called “sanctity” and practices associated with it  among settlers 
in Israel and the Occupied West Bank. He compares different notions of sanctity, “immanent” 
and “transcendent”, currently found in two different theological schools of Jewish thought. Both 
notions are the basis for settler identity, have implications for how settlers relate to and live in 
the world, and are inextricably linked to ideas of a Jewish state and nationhood. Believers in the 
notion of “immanent sanctity” see human activity in the world as the means to cultivate holiness; 
they can take some enjoyment in being in the world and pleasure in being “free” to mix with 
secular society. Believers in a “transcendent sanctity” see a much starker division between the 
profane and sacred that began the moment “God forces himself into ‘exile’” to make room for 
Creation. In this rationale, building the Jewish state and establishing new settlements are the 
means to redeem Creation and bring God back out of exile. Followers of the transcendent 
theology keep themselves separate from the rest of society fearing the contagion of secular 
values and morality. Astonishingly both theologies have nothing to say about the plight of 
Palestinians and the future of Palestine-Israel. Piety does not extend to other religious 
communities in the region even as it forms the basis of a passionate but recalcitrant political 
movement that erases others in its midst, a silence that may come back to haunt the settlers. In 
this regard, it would be valuable for Stern to explore the intersections of collective affect with the 
orchestration of political emotion, which Berlant (2012) notes are different processes but “with 
lots of convergences and parallel tracks at the same time” (Berlant and Greenwald 2012: 77).  
In “Valuing Affect: The Centrality of Emotion, Memory and Identity in Garage Sale 
Exchange,” Gretchen Herrmann takes us to a very different setting, the US garage sale. 
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Herrmann describes “transfers of affectively-charged possessions” in the garage sale exchange.  
By definition, the garage sale happens in a very intimate, privatized space, inside or just outside 
the seller’s home. The homeowner/seller welcomes outsiders into her home for the purpose of a 
transaction. The setting is emotionally charged, and the products are imbued with personal 
histories—some joyful, some unhappy, all of them poignant. Herrmann notes the garage sale 
venue allows for “a friendly, open informality that fosters affective exchanges among 
strangers…[uniting] shoppers and sellers in a unique affective way. The venue and the products 
themselves (used, with a history) seem to make a difference in setting the tone for the affective 
quality of the exchanges that result. Is it a stretch to suggest that the tone and quality of these 
exchanges also reflect a yearning for connection and community in our alienated world? We buy 
most new products in mass duplicated, brand name brick and mortar stores and shopping centers, 
or online where no human interaction at all is required. For her field sites, Hermann describes a 
closeness and a warmth that get forged very quickly between some sellers and buyers, an 
attachment that stands in stark contrast with the competitive, self-seeking individualism and 
materialism that dominates the contemporary marketplace. In the garage sale venue, sellers may 
want to generate revenue, but as Herrmann demonstrates, love, caring and generosity seem to 
prevail over crude financial profit. We wonder if this is always the case and if not, what might 
the exceptions mean? In some high-end suburbs of New York City, for example, garage sales 
can be sites of intense competition between antique dealers, consignment shop owners, and 
bargain hunters. We also wonder if there is any relationship between the habits of the consumer 
heart, trained as it has been by corporate marketers who spend billions of dollars devising ways 
to forge affective connections between consumers and products with images of “friendly, open 
informality”—and what happens in the garage sale venue.  
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In “Sex Work, Heroin Injection, and HIV Risk in Tijuana: A Love Story,” Jennifer 
Syvertsen and Angela Bazzi bring us into the complicated triangle of Cindy, Beto and structural 
inequality where love and safety, danger and comfort, well-being and risk, and sickness and 
sorrow hang in uneasy relationship with poverty, marginalization, stigma and discrimination. 
Syvertsen and Bazzi do not invoke “affect theory” to frame the presentation of their data and 
analysis. Instead they link phenomenology and political economy; that is, they attend to the 
subjective, the experiential, the experience of consciousness and of feelings while never losing 
sight of structural relations and locations. In so doing, we believe Syvertsen and Bazzi “get affect 
right.” The anthropologists take us into Cindy and Beto’s intimate world, their perceptions of it 
and the meanings they attach to their feelings, beliefs and behaviors. Their lives marked and 
constrained by structural violence, Cindy and Beto have crafted their own dangerous safe haven, 
an oxymoron that captures the nuances of a lifeworld caught in the web of forces beyond their 
control. Their lives reflect the “corporalization of grinding poverty” that has potential to sap 
political motivation (Nouvet 2014), a form of embodied social suffering that also affects health 
and well-being (Tapias 2006). 
We anthropologists have probably set ourselves up for the impossible: to capture lived 
experience, emotionality and perception, small and large-scale interactivity, intimacy and 
sociality, power, politics and ever changing material conditions of social life without reducing 
one to the other—and portraying all of it in narrative form. By means of evocative ethnography, 
this special collection on the anthropology of affect seeks to take up the challenge and fearlessly 
embrace the complexities.  
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